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ARGUMENT 
I. THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE PARTIES DEFINE DUTIES NOT 
CONTAINED IN ANY CONTRACT. THEREFORE, THE ECONOMIC 
LOSS RULE CANNOT APPLY. 
The most fundamental concept driving this case is the unique relationships created 
by, and the obligations imposed upon, the parties at Davencourt. The special nature of 
these relationships provides the backdrop as to why the Association's claims demand a 
different application of the economic loss rule. 
As stated by the Appellees, the economic loss rule "marks the fundamental 
boundary between contract... and tort law". (Appellees' Br. 11, citing Hermansen v. 
Tasuhs, 2002 UT 52, |13 , 48 P.3d 235.) Contract law is designed to enforce the 
expectancy interests of the contracting parties, while tort law imposes a duty of 
reasonable care that encourages individuals to avoid causing foreseeable harm to others. 
See Hermansen, 2002 UT 52, ^[13. The Appellees proffer that "where a party enters into 
a contract, contract law (not tort law) governs 'the bargained-for duties and liabilities' of 
those who exercised their freedom of contract." (Appellees' Br. 11, citing Grynberg v. 
Ouestar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, f41, 70 P.3d 1.) Conversely, in the absence of 
bargained-for contracts, it is clear that tort law must govern, especially where obligations 
and responsibilities are unilaterally imposed upon the non-contracting party. In this case, 
since the Association had no opportunity to bargain for and allocate any risk for its 
obligations, the Developer and Builder must be liable for their negligence in tort. 
The Association was organized and created by the Developer upon the filing of the 
Declaration of Easements, Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions ("Declaration"). (R. 
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at 587.) The Developer, pursuant to the Declaration, required the Association to accept 
title to the common areas and to maintain, repair, and replace the common areas, exterior 
surfaces, roofs, porches, streets, and sidewalks. (R. at 576.) It cannot be disputed that 
these obligations and responsibilities were unilaterally imposed upon the Association by 
the Developer. While the Association argues the Declaration is a contract between it and 
the Developer, the Association was not afforded any opportunity to negotiate its terms 
and discount its obligations for any apparent risks. The items, which the Association is 
obligated to repair and maintain were built and constructed by the Builder who is only in 
direct privity of contract with the Developer. There are no contracts between the Builder 
(or its various subcontractors) and the Association. 
Furthermore, the Developer not only unilaterally created and burdened the 
Association with significant maintenance and repair obligations, but the Developer also 
controlled the Association for several years until the Association was turned over to its 
members. This illustrates another significant reason why the policy behind the economic 
loss rule is thwarted in the homeowner association ("HOA") context: An HOA cannot 
engage in an arm's-length bargain with the very entity that controls it. The law cannot 
assume equal bargaining power where the HOA is unable to negotiate for and adjust 
accordingly its obligations and responsibilities. Thus, the developer is not at arm's-
length, but is a fiduciary to the HOA. This Court has declared that where disparity in 
circumstances "distorts the balance between the parties in a relationship to the degree that 
one party is exposed to unreasonable risk, the law may intervene by creating a duty on 
the advantaged party to conduct itself in a manner that does not reward exploitation of its 
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advantage." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp.. 2006 UT 47, f 16, 143 P.3d 283. The 
disparity existing between the Association and the Appellees clearly requires this Court's 
intervention, since the Association had to rely exclusively upon the Builder and 
Developer who built and created it. 
The Association, therefore, asks this Court to recognize that in the absence of 
bargained-for contractual privity, the economic loss rule does not preclude the 
Association from pursuing its tort-based claims. The barring of such, defeats all of the 
policy reasons behind tort jurisprudence. 
II. APPELLEES OWE INDEPENDENT DUTIES TO THE ASSOCIATION. 
THIS CASE IS OF FIRST IMPRESSION UNDER THE EXPANDED 
INDEPENDENT DUTY STANDARD ADOPTED WITH REGARD TO THE 
ECONOMIC LOSS RULE. 
Appellees argue that this case "is the biological twin" of American Towers Owners 
Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996) and, as a result, that this Court 
should automatically rule against the Association in the same manner that the Court ruled 
against the homeowners association in American Towers. (Appellees' Br. 9.) However, 
their argument ignores this Court's own statement in Grynberg that American Towers was 
decided under a different standard or rule and therefore has, at a minimum, diminished 
precedential value. 
The language of American Towers Owners Ass'n and SME Industries, two 
Utah construction cases, relied upon the products liability-based language 
of economic loss. In Hermansen v. Tasulis, we expressly adopted the 
independent duty-based rule articulated in Town of Alma and held that "the 
initial inquiry in cases where the line between contract and tort blurs is 
whether a duty exists independent of any contractual obligations between 
the parties." . . . Since they were decided before we adopted Colorado's 
interpretation,.. .we do not find American Towers Owners Ass'n and 
3 
SME Industries persuasive authority regarding the current state ofthe 
economic loss rule in Wyoming or Utah. 
Grvnberg, 2003 UT 8, ^ [49 (emphasis added). As this Court acknowledged in Grvnberg, 
the decision in American Towers did not take into consideration the relationships ofthe 
litigants, nor did it assess whether the defendants owed independent duties to the 
homeowners association. That fundamental difference in analysis is paramount here. 
Whether independent duties exist in a construction defect case involving an HOA is a 
case of first impression before this Court. For this reason alone, American Towers does 
not resolve this case.1 
Suiprisingly, notwithstanding this Court's plain statement about the expanded 
analysis under the economic loss rule first formulated in Hermansen, Appellees are still 
calling this Court's adoption of Colorado's interpretation ofthe economic loss rule a 
"narrow exemption," a "slight evolution" or a "slight[] change[]" in the law.2 (Appellees' 
1
 Defendants also cite to Snow Flower Homeowners' Ass'n v. Snow Flower, Ltd., 2001 
UT App 207, 31 P.3d 576, to support their contention that American Towers decides this 
matter. However, like American Towers, Snow Flower was also decided prior to this 
Court's adoption of Colorado's interpretation ofthe economic loss rule in Hermansen 
and, therefore applies the old (pre-Hennansen) standard and analysis ofthe economic 
loss rule. 
2
 Defendants also argue that the Association overstates the impact ofthe change of law 
enunciated in Hermansen. (Appellees' Br. 21-23.) Their argument, though, ignores that 
the Association's contentions are consistent with the understanding of others who have 
interpreted the change in the economic loss rule post-Hermansen. Appellate courts from 
at least two other states who have had to interpret Utah law on the economic loss rule in a 
case before them did so also under the belief that Utah completely adopted Colorado's 
version ofthe economic loss rule. Gulfstream Aerospace Services Corp. v. United States 
Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 635 S.E.2d 38, 44 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) ("The Supreme Court 
of Utah has expressly adopted the economic loss rule as interpreted and applied by 
Colorado courts."); Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., v. Eaton Metal Products Co., 272 
F.Supp.2d 482, 491-93 (E.D. Pa. 2003) ("In 2002, the Utah Supreme Court adopted 
4 
Br. 15-21.) In other words, they argue that American Towers is still good law even 
though the decision in American Towers was not reached under the analytical standard in 
effect today. 
However, Appellees ignore that the change fundamentally alters the analysis of 
any claim, tort or contract, involving the economic loss rule. The American Towers 
decision did not even address, let alone recognize, that duties independent of any 
contractual obligation were sources of an action in tort. Grynberg recognized this flaw in 
the American Towers decision and, accordingly, casts doubt on the continuing validity or 
persuasiveness of American Towers. 
In assessing whether an "independent duty" exists, courts look at the source of the 
duty alleged to have been violated. Hermansen, 2002 UT 52, f 16; Town of Alma v. 
Azco Constr.. Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Colo. 2000); Gulfstream Aerospace Services 
Corp.. 635 S.E.2d at 45 (citing Parr v. Triple L & J Corp.. 107 P.3d 1104, 1107 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2004); BRW. Inc. v. Dufficv & Sons. Inc.. 99 P.3d 66, 74 (Colo. 2004); Grynberg v. 
Agri Tech. Inc.. 10 P.3d 1267 (Colo. 2000)) (analyzing and applying Utah and Colorado 
law on economic loss rule for case involving damage to airplane that caught on fire over 
Utah and made emergency landing in Colorado). If there are any duties arising outside of 
those contained within a properly negotiated transaction, then tort law applies. Town of 
Alma, 10 P.3d at 1262. 
Colorado's version of the economic loss doctrine . . . . " "Because it has adopted 
wholesale Colorado's version of the doctrine, we predict that the Utah Supreme Court 
would follow Colorado's fuller exploration of this issue."). 
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At the trial court level and in its opening brief, the Association has examined 
multiple duties that Appellees, in their individual capacities, owe to the Association and 
the owners. In short, those duties are based upon the special relationship that each of 
those parties has with the Association and owners. "We have recognized that some 
special relationships by their nature automatically trigger an independent duty of care that 
supports a tort action even when the parties have entered into a contractual relationship." 
Id at 1263. 
Appellees state that because Developer and Woolstenhulme are developers, and 
Parry Construction is a builder (as opposed to real estate brokers, agents, or appraisers) 
that they owe no independent duties. (Appellees' Br. 31.) The Association disagrees. 
This Court has noted that such duties can exist where "disparity of skill and knowledge" 
may lead one party to rely more heavily on the other's expertise. Yazd, 2006 UT 47, f 24. 
Contrary to Appellees' claim that no such relationship exists in this case (Appellees' Br. 
31), the relationship between the Association and Appellees is precisely the type of 
relationship that gives rise to an independent duty. Yazd, 2006 UT 47, f 16 and f 24. 
Furthermore, Utah law imposes on developers and builders an extra-contractual 
duty to disclose any specialized knowledge obtained during the course of the 
development and construction that is material to potential buyers. See Yazd, 2006 UT 47, 
135; Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55,128, 94 P.3d 919; Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 
746 P.2d 763, 769, n. 5 (Utah 1987). This duty to disclose and the exposure to 
unreasonable risk are especially prevalent in an HOA setting. It is unreasonable and 
impracticable for owners to inspect the common areas and other structures maintained by 
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the HO A since: (1) the HO A repairs and maintains them, and (2) the costs associated with 
an inspection of the outside envelope of a multi-unit building (or multiple buildings) is 
prohibitive. For example, there are 38 buildings and 145 townhomes at Davencourt. An 
inspection of that scope would be unreasonable and cost-prohibitive for an individual 
purchaser. The Association was, therefore, forced to rely on the information presented to 
it by the Appellees. 
Finally, the Association has alleged that Developer and Woolstenhulme were 
fiduciaries of the Association and the unit owners. (R. at 29-25.) Fiduciaries owe duties 
to their constituents and those fiduciary obligations are independent duties that arise at 
law. Norman v.Arnold, 2002 UT 81,135, 57 P.3d 997. Thus contrary to the Appellees' 
assertion, Utah case law recognizes numerous independent duties running from the 
Developer and Builder to the Association. 
III. UTAH CASE LAW DEMONSTRATES A CLEAR, CONSISTENT 
MOVEMENT AWAY FROM THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE AS STATED 
IN AMERICAN TOWERS. 
This Court's recent case law shows a continuous movement away from the 
economic loss rule as expressed in American Towers. That retrenchment began with 
Hermansen and has been expanded in the subsequent cases of Grynberg, Smith, West v. 
Inter-Financial Inc., 2006 UT App 222, 139 P.3d 1059., Yazd, and Moore v. Smith. 2007 
UT App 101, 158 P.3d 562., all of which demonstrate that American Towers and the cases 
following it are no longer persuasive authority on the state of the economic loss rule. 
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1. SME3, Snow Flower and Fennell4 were Decided Before or During the Early 
Stages of this Court's Shift Away from American Towers and do not 
Accurately Represent Current Law. 
SME and Snow Flower were decided before this Court's shift away from the 
American Towers interpretation of the economic loss rule. These cases, which as 
Appellees point out, were released only two days apart (Appellees' Br. 14), represent 
American Towers at its peak, before Hermansen and subsequent cases retrenched the 
American Towers holding. In fact, Grynberg specifically names SME as a case that is no 
longer persuasive authority on the economic loss rule. Grynberg, 2003 UT 8, % 49. 
Like SME and Snowflower, Fennell does not represent the current state of the 
economic loss rule. While Fennell followed both Hermansen and Grynberg, its holding 
has been limited by this Court's Smith and Yazd decisions. Fennell 2003 UT App 291. 
Fennell a Court of Appeals case, held that the economic loss rule barred negligent 
misrepresentation claims, Id. at % 15, which were not barred under Smith and Yazd. See 
infra, III, 4. The Court of Appeals likely agrees since the Fennell decision cannot be 
reconciled with its more recent Moore decision, where negligent misrepresentation 
claims were deemed "viable." Moore, 2007 UT App. 101, f40. Thus, Fennell like 
American Towers, Snow Flower, and SME cannot be viewed as representing the current 
law with regard to the economic loss rule. 
3
 SME Indus., Inc. v Thompson, Ventulett Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, 28 
P.3d 669. 
4
 Fennell v. Green. 2003 UT App 291, 77 P.3d 339. 
8 
2. West Moore. Yazd and Smith have Followed Colorado's Economic Loss Rule, 
and Show that Hermansen is not an Aberration. 
The case law clearly shows that Hermansen was not carving out one narrow 
exception to the economic loss rule, but created a broad category of independent duties. 
West creates an independent duty to disclose accurate and complete information running 
from real estate appraisers to purchasers, separate from a realtor's similar independent 
duty to disclose in Hermansen. West v. Inter-Financial, Inc., 2006 UT App 222, ^|29, 139 
P.3d 1059. While the Appellees are right that the West exception to the economic loss 
rule is logical after Hermansen, (Appellees' Br. 20), West still recognized yet another 
independent duty entirely separate from Hermansen. West, 2006 UT App 222, f29. The 
subsequent cases of Moore, Yazd, and Smith have expanded upon these two duties, 
recognizing another independent duty to disclose material information to purchasers. See 
infra. III, 4. Thus, this Court's cases show that it has rejected the American Towers line 
of cases (SME and Fennell) and followed Colorado's independent duties analysis by 
recognizing numerous independent duties. 
3. The Case Law does not Clearly Limit the Economic Loss Rule to 
Construction Cases, and the Policy Reasons for Making that Limitation are 
Unpersuasive. 
Probably in recognition that Utah's current case law does in fact recognize 
numerous independent duties, Appellees next attempt to argue that those duties only 
apply in the non-construction context. (R. at 29-30.) Appellees use West to argue that 
American Towers controls in the construction or design context, and Hermansen controls 
in other professional contexts. West, 2006 UT App 222, f 22. That distinction however, is 
9 
wholly unpersuasive in light ofYazd and Smith, which recognize an exception to the 
economic loss rule for construction professionals. See infra III, 4. Furthermore, the Utah 
Court of Appeals implicitly abandoned the distinction between construction and non-
construction when, in Moore, it allowed a negligent misrepresentation claim to proceed, 
even though the claim was asserted against a developer. Moore, 2007 UT App 101, |^ 39, 
158 P.3d 562. If American Towers still controlled in all cases affecting the improvement 
and sale of real property the negligent misrepresentation claims would clearly have been 
barred by the economic loss rule. 
Looking at SME and Grynberg together, this Court has also implicitly recognized 
that the independent duty analysis applies to construction and non-construction 
professionals alike. For example, while in SME, this Court "expressly limited the 
economic loss rule to bar tort actions against construction and design professionals, but 
left the door open for actions against other professionals" (West 2006 UT App 222, f 12, 
citing SME, 2001 UT 54, ^  38 n. 9), Grynberg, however, rejected the construction 
professionals distinction by holding that SME was not persuasive authority on the state of 
the economic loss rule. Grynberg, 2003 UT 8, f49. 
Furthermore, the reasoning in West that the economic loss rule is particularly 
applicable to construction is wholly unpersuasive. West, 2006 UT App 222, f 8. Citing to 
American Towers, the West court reasoned that "'the economic loss rule is "particularly 
applicable" to construction and design situations because parties "can avoid economic 
loss" with contracts and are thus "free to adjust their respective obligations to satisfy their 
mutual expectations.'" Id., (citing American Towers, 930 R2d at 1190). The economic 
10 
loss rule is supposed to prevent tort law from thwarting the intentions of the contracting 
parties. Nothing about that policy is specific to construction contracts. Neither the West 
court, nor Appellees provide a persuasive reason why parties can "adjust their respective 
obligations to satisfy their mutual expectations" through a construction contract but not 
through a non-construction contract. Perhaps that is why subsequent decisions, like 
Smith, Yazd, and Moore, have rejected the distinction. 
4. Together, Smith, Yazd and Moore Create an Independent Dnty to Disclose 
Conditions that are Known or that Should be Known by both a Developer 
and Builder. 
Appellees omit Smith, Yazd and Moore from its list of Utah cases dealing with the 
economic loss rule. (Appellees'Br. 12.) Viewed together, Yazd and Smith recognize a 
duty outside the economic loss rule to disclose specialized knowledge, and Moore 
confirms the Court of Appeal's interpretation of that analysis provided by this Court. 
Smith recognized that a developer can have a duty to disclose material information 
to purchasers. (Smith, 2004 UT 55,116; Loveland 746 P.2d at 769). In Yazd, the Court 
found that the duty to disclose also applied to builders, and remanded the case to be 
decided on the facts. Yazd, therefore, without specifically discussing the economic loss 
rule, implicitly recognizes that the economic loss rule does not bar the duty to disclose, 
otherwise, the case could have been decided on the legal issue, and there would have 
been no need to remand it. 
Appellees try to limit Yazd to its facts, saying that Yazd dealt with a narrow 
fraudulent non-disclosure case where the economic loss rule does not apply, but the 
holding in Yazd is clearly broader than that. The Yazd court clearly states that Yazd is an 
11 
extension of Smith (Yazd, 2006 UT 47, % 26), which held there was a duty to disclose that 
extended to both fraud and negligent nondisclosure claims. Moreover, Moore was 
decided after Yazd and clearly holds that negligent nondisclosure is an exception to the 
economic loss rule. Moore, 2007 UT App 101, If 39. Thus, the Court of Appeals agrees 
with the Association: Utah case law recognizes an exception to the economic loss rule for 
a breach of the duty to disclose, whether the breach is negligent or otherwise. 
Thus, with the exception of Fennel!, which was partially overruled by Smith, Yazd 
and Moore, every economic lose rule case since Hermansen, (Grynberg, West, Frandsen, 
Yazd and Moore) has recognized independent duties beyond any contract in those cases, 
and has expanded those duties. 
IV. SENATE BILL 220 DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE. 
Appellees and their supporting Amici parties argue extensively that this Court 
must defer to the legislature's recent attempt to codify American Towers5 via Senate Bill 
220 ("SB 220), located at Utah Code Ann. §78B-4-513, which they allege reflects the 
voice of Utah's citizens.6 (Appellees' Br. 9.) However, it is clear that SB 220 does not 
apply to, and should have no impact upon this case. 
5
 As explained above, American Towers is no longer persuasive authority with regard to 
the economic loss rule, since it was abandoned for the independent duty framework. 
Grynberg, 2003 UT 8, |49. If SB 220 is interpreted to do what it was intended to d o -
namely restore American Towers to its past glory—then other decisions like Hennansen, 
West, Smith, Yazd, and Moore which recognize exceptions to the American Towers rule, 
are also abrogated by the statute. 
6
 During House Floor Debate on SB 220, the Sponsor of the bill in the House, 
Representative Steve Urquhart, specifically said that the bill was an attempt to codify 
American Towers. http://recordings.le.state.ut.us/mp3/House/rhouse-0303082.mp3 See 
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SB 220 was codified on May 5,2008, approximately two years after the 
Association filed this lawsuit and several years after the townhomes at Davencourt were 
built. Utah law provides that "[n]o part of [Utah Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so 
declared." See Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3; see also, Soriano v. Graul 2008 UT App 188, 
%6, 186 P.3d 960. Furthermore, this Court has repeatedly held that "a statute is not to be 
applied retroactively unless the statute expressly declares that it operates retroactively." 
Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R.. 2004 UT 80, f 39, 136 P.3d 1185. Since SB 220 does 
not contain express retroactive language, it is inapplicable to the Association's claims and 
should not have any bearing on this Court's decision. 
V. THE COURT SHOULD FIND IN FAVOR OF THE ASSOCIATION'S 
CLAIM FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES. 
1. SB 220 Explicitly Provides A Remedy for Implied Warranties. 
Appellees urge this Court to apply and consider SB 220 and its underlying policy 
to this case. (Appellees' Br. 32-34.) However, as explained above, not only is the statute 
inapplicable since it has no retroactivity language, the statute is likely unconstitutional, 
also, Addendum 1 showing the bill's sponsors' (the Utah Home Builders Association; 
Utah Association of Realtors; and the Utah Property Rights Coalition, a group made up 
of the largest real estate development companies in Utah) intent to codify American 
Towers. 
7
 While SB 220 is clearly inapplicable to this case, the Association believes it violates the 
Open Courts clause of the Utah Constitution, which guarantees every person the right to 
access the courts to receive "remedy by due course of law" for injury to "person" or 
"property" Utah Const. Art. I, § 11. SB 220 is an attempt to deny plaintiffs, like the 
Association, all remedy for damage to property. See also Berry ex. rel. Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp.. ("if the Legislature were to abolish all negligence actions [...] and provide 
no substitute remedy [...] [it] would be unconstitutional") 717 P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 
1985). 
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and this Court should not follow the policy underpinnings of an unconstitutional statute. 
Nevertheless, if this Court is inclined to recognize the policy behind SB 220, the 
Association requests that it also recognize an implied warranty of habitability. SB 220 
specifically provides that an action "for defective design or construction is limited to 
breach of the contract, whether written or otherwise, including both express and implied 
warranties." Utah Code Ann. §78B-4-513(l). While Appellees have argued that Utah 
has not recognized an implied warranty of habitability (Appellees' Br. 40-45), SB 220 
clearly provides injured plaintiffs recourse under an implied warranty. If the Court is 
willing to defer to one part of the statute dealing with the economic loss rule, it should 
o 
also defer to the part recognizing an implied warranty of habitability. 
2. Recent Case Law Supports Recovery for Implied Warranties. 
Ignoring the statute, there is another compelling reason that this Court should 
recognize an implied warranty of habitability. Courts usually reject implied warranties 
under the false assumption that buyers and sellers of residential property "have similar 
bargaining power." American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1195. However, this Court, in more 
recent cases, has recognized that home purchasers do not in fact have the kind of 
specialized knowledge they need to effectively bargain with sophisticated contractors and 
developers. See Yazd, 143 P.3d 283, ^ 24 ("Modern home construction requires a high 
degree of knowledge and expertise [...]. We have found that the disparity in skill and 
O 
During House Floor Debate on SB 220, House Representatives, on at least two 
occasions, specifically stated the validity of an Implied Warranty of Habitability. The 
audio of the floor debate can be heard at the following: 
http://recordings.le.state.ut.us/mp3/House/rhouse-0303082.mp3 
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knowledge between home buyers and builder-contractors leads buyers to rely on the 
builder-contractorfs expertise."), Smith, 2004 UT 55, f 16 ("[I]n order to protect 
unsophisticated purchasers, under Loveland, a developer, subdivider or person 
performing similar tasks has a duty to exercise reasonable care to insure that the 
subdivided lots are suitable for construction), citing to McDonald v. Mianecki, 398 A.2d 
1283, 1292 (1979) ("Whether the builder be large or small, the purchaser relies upon his 
superior knowledge and skill, and he impliedly represents that he is qualified to erect a 
habitable dwelling. [The builder] is also in a better position to prevent the existence of 
major defects.") and Moxlev v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 R2d 733, 735 (Wyo. 1979) 
("Consumer protection demands that those who buy homes are entitled to rely on the skill 
of the builder and that the house is constructed so as to be reasonably fit for its intended 
use."). Having repeatedly accepted the policy justification for an implied warranty of 
habitability, and with the Utah legislature affirming the viability of a cause of action for a 
breach of an implied warranty, this Court should now hold that such an implied warranty 
of habitability exists in Utah. 
3- By Creating a Cost-Sharing Mechanism within the Association, the 
Developer Impliedly Represented that the Units were of Good Quality, or 
that the Assessments were Adequate to Meet the Association's Obligation 
to Repair them. 
The Developer made representations outside the contractual arrangements that 
warrant that the construction was of sufficient quality and durability that the 
Association's repair and maintenance fund would not be overwhelmed with costs to 
replace negligently constructed portions of the buildings and repair resulting damages. 
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Specifically the Developer created a unique covenant-based contractual arrangement 
whereby the unit owners own the units in name, but the Association has the exclusive 
legal obligation and duty to maintain the very systems which envelop and protects them. 
This system creates interdependency between the unit owners by forcing them to cast 
their resources together to fond the operations of the Association as a group, allowing the 
Association to fulfill its obligation to repair and maintain the exterior walls, roofs, and 
porches of the units. This cost-sharing system of maintenance implicitly represents that 
assessments, which were set and controlled by the Developer until turnover to the 
members, were adequate to meet the repair obligations of the Association. 
The Developer created the Association, was intimately involved in the 
construction process, and was responsible for setting the assessment rate. By controlling 
and overseeing the construction process (R. at 42), a developer has constructive 
knowledge of the quality of construction. Smith, 2004 UT 55, f 20 ("[The contractor] is 
deemed to possess the knowledge of a reasonably prudent builder-contractor under 
similar circumstances and, as a matter of law, a builder of ordinary prudence would have 
discovered the insufficient compaction on lot 223.")- For example, in this case, the 
Developer and Builder not only had constructive knowledge, but actual knowledge of the 
collapsible soils throughout the Project. (R. at 290.) 
In addition to its construction duties, the Developer had the responsibility to set 
the initial assessment rates of the Association. Because the Developer was aware of the 
Association's monthly expenses, its maintenance responsibility, and the construction-
defects rampant throughout the Project, the Developer was required to set the assessment 
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rates high enough, to cover both the normal operation expenses of the Association and to 
fund a reserve account for replacement and maintenance of the building components. By 
choosing the assessment level it did, the Developer implicitly represented to unit 
purchasers and to the post-turnover Association Board of Directors that the assessments 
were set at a high enough level to cover any necessary repairs. 
Unfortunately, the Developer not only failed to disclose the material latent defects 
throughout Davencourt, the Developer also set the monthly assessments at a rate 
insufficient to adequately fund the reserve account and cover the necessary construction 
repairs. (R. at 37.) In fact, not only did the Developer make these implied 
misrepresentations, but he knowingly handicapped the Association from making the 
necessary assessment rate increases once the latent defects were discovered. For 
example, the Developer in Section 13.07 of the Declaration capped the annual 
assessments at $840 per unit. (R. at 574.) The Developer further prevented the 
Association from increasing assessments to adequate levels by establishing a maximum 
annual increase of fifteen percent (15%). (R. at 574.) 
As a result, the Developer clearly implied that the construction was of sufficient 
quality that the annual increases were unnecessary and that the assessments were set at an 
adequate level to replace the necessary building components. Since the Developer was 
both intimately familiar with, and responsible for, the construction, assessment rates, and 
assessment capping, the Developer should be held responsible. 
The Developer made these representations, not only to the initial unit owners, but 
also to the post-turnover Association. Not only did the Association rely upon the 
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adequacy of the Developer's initial assessment structure, but the Developer, via the 
Declaration, prevented the Association from making the necessary increases. The 
Association was entitled to so rely, based upon the Developer's intimate knowledge of 
the construction process and its control of the Association. The Developer clearly 
breached a duty it owed to the Association independent of any contract. 
VI. THE APPELLEES' THEORY THAT THE ASSOCIATION SHOULD 
PROTECT ITSELF BY INSISTING THE DEVELOPER ASSIGN ITS 
CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS TO THE ASSOCIATION IS UNWORKABLE 
AND NAIVE. 
The Appellees want the Court to believe that the complex issues inherent in this 
case can be handled easily by having the developer assign its contractual rights against 
the builder to the HO A. (Appellees' Br. 10-11.) This solution is simply not viable and 
incredibly naive. 
A contract "negotiated by the developer" is not a contract negotiated by the HOA 
regardless of whether the developer is the builder (as is frequently the case), the 
developer and the builder are related parties, or whether they are completely independent. 
In this case, the Developer's and Builder's interests are potentially adverse. Yet the 
Builder and Developer have decided to hire one law firm, and limit their defenses to 
those that protect both parties, presumably to maintain a pre-litigation business 
relationship. 
The solution urged upon the Court by the Appellees (clearly arising out of the 
language of SB 220), begs the further question of which "contract" is it that would be 
assigned? Is it the agreement with the general contractor? Is it the agreement with any 
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design professionals? What about subcontractor agreements? Perhaps it is an agreement 
between the developer and the selling entity? Or maybe we are expecting the developer 
to "negotiate" an agreement with the newly created and wholly controlled HOA which is 
not tainted by the profit motive! 
Any attempt to respond to the suggestion made by the Appellees only serves to 
highlight the difficulty with applying traditional notions of contract, which address the 
rights and liabilities of the parties, to the type of relationships created by the project at 
issue in this case. It simply makes no sense to allow the developer to "negotiate" the 
rights of future owners by creating or assigning a contract with or to an HOA that is 
without the benefit of an arm's-length relationship. 
VII. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION FOR 
CORRECTNESS, NOT FOR ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
1. This Appeal is from both the Motion to Dismiss, and the Denial of Plaintiff s 
Motion to Amend. 
Because this is an appeal from the trial court's first September 21, 2006 
Memorandum Decision ("2006 Memo"), which decided the Appellees' motion to dismiss, 
this Court should apply the 12(b)(6) standard and review the district court's decision "for 
correctness, granting no deference to the district court's ruling." Pendleton v. Utah State 
Bar, 2000 UT 96, f 5, 16 R3d 1230. 
While it is true that this appeal was taken as a matter of right when the trial court 
certified its September 11, 2007 Memorandum Decision ("2007 Memo") as final under 
rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 658.), all of the claims at issue in this 
case, which the Association was denied leave to reinstate in the 2007 Memo, were first 
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dismissed by the trial court under a 12(b)(6) standard in the 2006 Memo. This Court 
should, therefore, apply the 12(b)(6) standard of review because a reversal of the 
dismissal in the 2006 Memo would make the denial of leave to amend in the 2007 Memo 
moot. 
The fact that the Association asked the trial court for leave to amend to reinstate 
dismissed claims before it proceeded to appeal does not mean that the 12(b)(6) standard 
of review should be replaced with the denial of leave to amend standard. (Appellees' Br. 
45, asserting abuse of discretion standard applies.) The Association has the right to 
appeal both decisions once made final. Utah R. App. R 3. The trial court clearly thought 
the appeal was from the 2006 Memo when it discussed it in light of the Association's 
request to certify the case for appeal. (R. at 658.) The Association also made it clear that 
it intended to appeal both decisions when it said it was appealing from both in its Notice 
of Appeal and when it attached both as exhibits to the Docketing Statement. Thus, this 
appeal is from both memorandum decisions, not just the second. Thus, again, the 
12(b)(6) standard of review (for correctness) must apply to decide whether the claims 
should be reinstated. 
2. The Motion to Amend Should be Reviewed under the Correctness Standard. 
The Association moved the trial court to amend the complaint to both add new 
parties and new facts, and to amend to reinstate dismissed claims. (R. at 667.) The trial 
court implicitly acknowledged that the only reason it did not reinstate the claims was 
because it rejected the legal arguments for recovery despite the new case law and facts. 
(R. at 658.) Furthermore, the trial court specifically stated that the case was in its early 
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stages and acknowledged that no prejudice would befall newly added parties if it granted 
the Appellant leave to bring in additional parties. (Id.) Thus, even if this appeal were 
only from the 2007 Memo, the Court should review the case for correctness because the 
trial court's denial of leave to amend was based only on the legal question of whether the 
Association stated a valid legal claim for relief, not on any question of fact or discretion. 
Drake v. Industrial Com'n of Utah. 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997). 
3, The Trial Court has Abused its Discretion. 
While the Association believes that abuse of discretion is the wrong standard to 
apply to this appeal, even if it is the correct standard, the trial court's denial of leave to 
amend is an abuse of discretion. Under the law of the case doctrine, more particularly 
known as the mandate rule, a lower court must follow the case law of the appellate 
courts. Thurston v. Box Elder County. 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995). The trial court 
abused its discretion by denying the Association its right to reinstate claims based on the 
new case law, specifically Yazd, Smith, and Moore, and its discovery of the Appellees' 
knowledge of, and failure to disclose, collapsible soils. That reinstatement was not 
discretionary, and therefore, the trial court's denial was an abuse of discretion and should 
be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Among King Hammurabi of Babylon's Code of Laws were several which 
regulated the building contractors of the time. Of the 282 codes, numbers 228 through 
233 are those which represented the rules for construction: 
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228. If a builder has built a house for a man, and finished it, he shall pay him a fee of 
two shekels of silver, for each SAR built upon. 
229. If a builder has built a house for a man, and has not made his work sound, and 
the house he built has fallen, and caused the death of its owner, that builder shall 
be put to death. 
230. If it is the owner's son that is killed, the builder's son shall be put to death. 
231. If it is the slave of the owner that is killed, the builder shall give slave for slave 
to the owner of the house. 
232. If he has caused the loss of goods, he shall render back whatever he has 
destroyed. Moreover, because he did not make sound the house he built, and it 
fell, at his own cost he shall rebuild the house that fell. 
233. If a builder has built a house for a man, and has not keyed his work, and the wall 
has fallen, that builder shall make that wall firm at his own expense. 
Codex Hammurabi, Babylon (1792-1750 BC) 
While some may wish that we lived in a society where the simplicity of 
Hammurabi's Code could answer questions like those before the Court, modern practices 
involving the improvement of real property for use as both shelter and place of business 
have become infinitely more complex than was recognized by King Hammurabi. Today 
the relationships involving land preparation, planning and zoning, engineering and 
design, financing and marketing, calculation of maintenance reserves, and acquisition of 
appropriate insurance, not to mention the actual construction itself- which often involves 
dozens of independent parties, creates a complex interwoven set of legal rights and 
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obligations. This is exacerbated in the case of an HOA, where to one degree or another, 
those who will occupy the improved real property are forever bound by interdependent 
obligations and rights which are critical to the viability of the improved real property 
itself, and yet they were not even a party to the creation of those critical rights and 
obligations. The reality of this complexity is that even well-intentioned attempts to frame 
and limit by contract the obligations and rights inherent therein is ultimately futile. 
Were it so that the Codex Hammurabi could be "tweaked" to satisfy the demands 
and realities of modem society all would be much simpler. It is the fear of the 
Association that the Utah legislature in enacting SB 220 has attempted to do just that. 
Unfortunately the timing of its adoption does not allow the Association to claim that the 
issue has been properly preserved so as to argue its constitutionality, but the Court's 
opinion in this case will no doubt be read carefully by all those parties to these complex 
transactions. It is clear that this case turns on the pivotal question of whether American 
Towers finally and completely answered all of those thorny questions placed before the 
trial court as reflected in its 2006 and 2007 memorandum decisions. The position of the 
parties is obviously clear. The Association cannot reconcile the lack of contractual rights, 
protections, and responsibilities with the seeming obvious obligations of those who 
participated in creating what they now are required to live with. Those who collaborate 
to perform all of the myriad tasks involved in the creation of these real property 
constructs have clearly stated, both by legislative fiat and in the positions taken before 
our judiciary, the desire to simplify these relationships even when it cannot reasonably be 
done. 
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HO As are a fact of life in Utah that is not going to reverse itself. As the 
availability of land suitable for construction of homes continues to shrink by consumption 
and municipalities continue to require developers to construct and provide a vehicle for 
maintenance of many of the traditional common facilities or amenities which consumers 
have come to reasonably expect, an increasingly large percentage of Utah's homeowners 
will find themselves involved in these complex interdependent relationships. 
The Association is not asking for unnecessary complexity. The Association simply 
asks the Court to recognize the reality that a single owner cannot meaningfully influence 
the contract(s) that results in the construction of these complex projects. For cabinets, 
floor coverings, finishings, etc., it may be possible for a contract between the seller and 
purchaser of an HO A to reflect their negotiated expectations. But it is impossible that 
each of one-hundred or more owners could so negotiate without rendering the effort 
meaningless in a chaos of inconsistency. This is doubly true when we realize that in 
nearly every case the project is complete before the purchaser arrives. 
A modern condominium or attached multi-family HOA complex is not a product. 
A toaster is a product. This case is not simply a construction defect case. This case 
requires the Court to analyze the profusion of unavoidable relationships required to bring 
about this type of project. Not all of those relationships can be or should be expected to 
be reflected in the simplicity argued by the Appellees. 
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TH RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13 m day of October 2008. 
Michael B. Miller 
A. Richard Vial 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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April 4, 2008 
Utah Property Rights 
Coalition Newsletter 
Spring 2008, Vol. 1 
In this issue: 
• 2008 UPRC Legislative Recap 
• 2008 UPRC Outlook 
• Call for Recruitment of Affiliate and Associate 
Members 
2008 UPRC Legislative Recap 
The Utah Property Rights Coalition once again enjoyed a very 
successful legislative session. The top four priority bills for the UPRC all 
passed and have been signed by Governor Huntsman. 
The success of the UPRC legislative agenda is due in large part to the 
efforts of many UPRC members. The UPRC Executive Officers (Chris 
Gamvroulas, Bill Perry, Jr., and Ryan Mecham) and others devote 
countless hours both during the legislative session and throughout the 
year working with the State Legislature and the Utah League of Cities 
and Towns to craft, and then pass, legislation that improves the 
environment in which we conduct business. 
The UPRC also continues to be extremely well-served by our lobbyist 
team of Kyler, Kohler, and Ostermiller. 
Without question, the biggest legislative victory for the industry this 
year was the passage of SB 220 . Kudos to Taz Biesinger and the 
Utah Home Builders Association for leading the charge on SB 220. SB 
220 would not have passed by such a large margin, and without 
significant amendment, without the efforts of the UPRC, the Utah 
Association of REALTORS®, and our lobbyists. I t was a great team 
effort to pass a very important bill for the industry. 
To recap, SB 220 did the following: 
Codifies existing Utah law (American Towers) and protects the free 
market and the ability of consumers and builders to contract to build a 
variety of types of housing without the fear of future lawsuits by tort 
lawyers. I t does this by: 
1. limiting defective design or construction causes of action to 
breach of contract claims, rather than third party tort claims 
such as "diminution of value/' 
2. Tort claims are still preserved for those who are physically 
injured by defective design or construction. 
In addition to SB 220, all three of the UPRC-ULCT consensus bills 
passed. To review, those bills were: 
Senate Bill 196-Sponsored by Senator Niederhauser and dealt with 
improvement assurances. The bill: 
• Streamlines the process of getting a decision by a local 
government regarding subdivision improvements and warranty 
work. The builder can send a written request to get a decision 
within 15 days for improvements and within 45 days for 
warranty work. (There is an exception if winter weather delays 
the ability to make an inspection.); 
• Requires that if the improvements or warranty work are rejected 
that the local government must "comprehensively and with 
specificity list the reasons for its determination/' (This enables a 
builder to get a final and complete punch list to eliminate the 
problem of receiving multiple and changing punch lists.); 
• Allows counties and municipalities to allow subdivision plat 
recording or development activity before completing required 
improvements if an improvement assurance is provided and 
other conditions are met; 
• Prohibits counties and municipalities from imposing a requirement 
on the holder of an approved subdivision plat and issued land use 
permit that is not expressed in the plat, documents on which the 
plat is based, or the written record evidencing approval of the 
plat; 
• Prohibits counties and municipalities from withholding acceptance 
of subdivision improvements because of a failure to comply with 
a requirement that is not expressed in the subdivision plat, 
documents on which the plat is based, or the written record 
evidencing approval of the plat; and 
• Prohibits counties and municipalities from withholding issuance of 
a certificate of occupancy because of a failure to comply with a 
requirement that is not expressed in the written record 
evidencing approval of the building permit. 
House Bi l l 177, sponsored by Representative Morley, creates a 
framework that regulates how local governments deal with potential 
geologic hazards. This is important because city and county powers 
currently have very few limits. The bill: 
• Defines what a constitutes a flood plain as well as geologic 
hazards and potential geologic hazards; 
• Limits a municipal government to regulate the above three items 
only to protect life and substantial loss of or damage to real 
property; and 
• Creates a process to resolve a "battle of the experts" when it 
